Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural. evolutionary. and biological psychology. as well as in anthropology and primatology.
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love. but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that'? Was it OK for them to make love?
Most people who hear the above story immediately say that it was wrong for the siblings to make love. and they then begin searching for reasons (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000) . They point out the dangers of inbreeding, only to remember that Julie and Mark used two forms of birth control. They argue that Julie and Mark will be hurt, perhaps emotionally, even though the story makes it clear that no harm befell them. Eventually, many people say something like. "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong." But what model of moral judgment allows a person to know that something is wrong without knowing why?
Moral psychology has long been dominated by rationalist models of moral judgment (Figure 1 ). Rationalist approaches in philosophy stress "the power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths about the world" (Williams, 1967, p. 69) . Rationalist ap-preaches in moral psychology, by extension, say that moral knowledge and moral judgment are reached primarily by a process of reasoning and reflection (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 193211965; Turiel, 1983) . Moral emotions such as sympathy may sometimes be inputs to the reasoning process, but moral emotions are not the direct causes of moral judgments. In rationalist models, one briefly becomes a judge, weighing issues of harm, rights, justice, and fairness, before passing judgment on Julie and Mark. If no condemning evidence is found, no condemnation is issued.
This article reviews evidence against rationalist models and proposes an alternative: the social intuitionist model (Figure 2) . Intuitionism in philosophy refers to the view that there are moral truths and that when people grasp these truths they do so not by a process of ratiocination and reflection but rather by a process more akin to perception, in which one "just sees without argument that they are and must be true" (Harrison, 1967, p. 72) . Thomas Jefferson's declaration that certain truths are "self-evident" is an example of ethical intuitionism. Intuitionist approaches in moral psychology, by extension, say that moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments (Haidt, in press; Kagan, 1984; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; J. Q. Wilson, 1993) . Moral intuition is a kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning.
The social part of the social intuitionist model proposes that moral judgment should be studied as an interpersonal process. Moral reasoning is usually an ex post facto process used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people. In the social intuitionist model, one feels a quick flash of revulsion at the thought of incest and one knows intuitively that something is wrong. Then, when faced with a social demand for a verbal justification, one becomes a lawyer trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth. One puts forth argument after argument, never wavering in the conviction that Julie and Mark were wrong, even after one's last argument has been shot down. In the social intuitionist model it becomes plausible to say, "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong."
The article begins with a brief review of the history of rationalism in philosophy and psychology. It then describes the social http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.emotionaldog.pdf 3. Consilience. Edward 0. Wilson (1998) resurrected the term consilience to refer to the degree to which facts and theories link up across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation. He argued that theories that contribute to the unification ot the sciences should be preferred to those that contribute to their fragmentation. The present article has tried to show that the social intuitionist model easily links findings in social and developmental psychology to recent findings and theories in neuroscience, primatology. and anthropology. but perhaps a similar case can be made for rationalist models. The debate between rationalism and intuitionism, now over 200 years old, is not just a debate between specific models: it is a debate between perspectives on the human mind. All of the disciplines that study the mind should contribute to the debate.
Conclusion
Rationalist models made sense in the 1960s and 1970s. The cognitive revolution had opened up new ways of thinking about morality and moral development. and it was surely an advance to think about moral judgment as a form of information processing. But times have changed. Now we know (again) that most of cognition occurs automatically and outside of consciousness and that people cannot tell us how they really reached a judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . Now we know that the brain is a connectionist system that tunes up slowly but is then able to evaluate complex situations quickly (Bechtel & Abrahamsen. 1991 ). Now we know that emotions are not as irrational (Frank, 1988) , that reasoning is not as reliable (Kahneman & Tversky. 1984) , and that animals are not as amoral (de Waal. 1996) as we thought in the 1970s. The time may be right, therefore, to take another look at Hume's perverse thesis: that moral emotions and intuitions drive moral reasoning, just as surely as a dog wags its tail. . . , 
